In political and legal discourse, social cohesion is invoked to promote multicultural inclusion, ease tensions and reconcile diverse views. Mizaan Law recognises and supports its important purpose of fostering social unity, belonging and mutual respect across a diverse society. The Scanlon Foundation measures social cohesion through belonging, justice, participation and acceptance.[1]
Political participation and trust in government are measures of social cohesion, not threats to it.[2] Research explains that social cohesion depends not merely on the absence of conflict but on bonds and shared norms enabling cooperation despite disagreement.[3] Dissent and accountability can therefore sustain the cohesion they are accused of undermining.
Yet the concept’s lack of a clear definition leaves it vulnerable to being invoked to silence dissent and weaken accountability. Two recent examples expose how this danger particularly affects Muslims while carrying wider implications for democratic rights and freedoms across Australian society.
On 29 September, the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC) decided that police officers and civilian witnesses in Operation Makalu would be examined privately, while senior officers could later testify publicly.[4] The investigation concerns police conduct at the Sydney Town Hall protest on 9 February.
The events of 9 February affected people from diverse backgrounds, with particular consequences for Australian Muslims. Footage of police confronting worshippers was broadcast internationally.[5] Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia reported eyewitness accounts of unprovoked violence against Muslims praying,[6] while Human Rights Watch verified footage of police violently dispersing people kneeling in prayer.[7] Legal Observers NSW published a report drawing on more than 150 pieces of evidence documenting police conduct.[8]
For Muslims, the harm extended beyond physical injury. Witnessing people subjected to force while praying strikes at the heart of dignity, religious freedom and identity. It erodes confidence in the very institutions entrusted with protection. Repairing that trust begins with being heard, rigorous and demonstrable accountability, and a genuine commitment to preventing recurrence.
Yet in its decision published on 8 October, the LECC warned that an investigation conducted largely in public might provoke discord harmful to “social cohesion”.[9] Operational officers up to Inspector rank have been granted pseudonyms and will be examined privately. Impacted civilians will also testify privately, without being afforded the choice to give evidence publicly, partly because hearing them publicly while examining police privately was considered inconsistent with a “balanced approach”.[10] But must fairness require the same restrictions for those exercising State force and those alleging harm? Witnesses may testify privately and their accounts may later be published, but neither is a substitute for being publicly heard. How can public trust be restored if those entrusted with the State’s authority to use force are shielded from public scrutiny?
Section 63 of the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (NSW) permits examinations, or parts of examinations, to be held publicly or privately, but a public examination may occur only if the LECC considers it appropriate. In exercising that discretion, the commission must consider the seriousness of alleged misconduct, the public benefit of exposure, competing privacy interests, reputational prejudice, including prejudice caused by not holding an examination publicly, and whether public examination may encourage witnesses to assist.[11] The Act also aims to independently investigate and expose serious police misconduct.[12] The LECC recognised the value of scrutiny, particularly after senior police publicly defended the operation.[13] If they can defend it publicly, why should evidence challenging that account remain private? The question is not whether private examinations are lawful, but whether the particular restrictions adequately balance legitimate protections against transparency and the public interest in accountability. Independent oversight should build confidence, not diminish it through opacity.
Police exercise executive power, while the LECC's independence from ministerial direction is protected by statute.[30] Although not a court, its procedures must withstand scrutiny, particularly where they appear to favour police. The rule of law demands independent accountability for executive power.[31]
A 2025 Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) review found that excessive police force can deepen grievances and procedural fairness can reduce escalation. It describes “tyrannical peace” as fragile calm secured through repression without resolving grievances.[14] Although the research concerns protest policing rather than LECC hearings, it raises a pertinent question. Can limiting public scrutiny repair trust already damaged by unresolved grievances?
In Jarrett v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWCA 62, the NSW Court of Appeal invalidated the Public Assembly Restriction Declaration (PARD) scheme for impermissibly burdening the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. It rejected treating potential divisiveness, disharmony, incivility or disruption as sufficient to restrict public assemblies.[15] The Court did not hold that social cohesion could never be a legitimate governmental objective. It rejected a blunt scheme that discouraged assemblies without adequate attention to their individual characteristics or importance as political communication.[16]
Although Jarrett does not govern LECC examinations, its democratic warning is relevant. Social cohesion should not become a blanket justification for restricting political participation merely because expression, protest or public scrutiny may be contentious or uncomfortable. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 likewise recognised that restricting a preferred mode of protest may burden the implied freedom when it substantially impairs political communication, even if less effective alternatives exist.[17]
Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects peaceful assembly,[18] and the UN Human Rights Committee says States must respect, protect and facilitate it.[19] Neither Article 21 nor the implied freedom establishes an individual right to public LECC hearings. Both nevertheless reinforce why political disagreement and public scrutiny should not automatically be portrayed as threats to social cohesion.
The tension extends beyond the LECC. The Letters Patent establishing the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion link the concept to democracy, freedom and the rule of law.[20] Yet Justice François Kunc has described social cohesion as “protean”, noting its lack of a clear definition.[21] If social cohesion protects democratic freedoms in one setting but justifies limiting transparency and accountability in another, what prevents it from becoming a convenient means of undermining the very principles it claims to uphold?
The Scanlon Foundation’s Mapping Social Cohesion report states that “Differences in ideas and values are central to democracy.”[22] It identifies public debate and protest as signs of democratic strength. Cohesion is measured by how society accommodates differences, not how effectively it suppresses them.
On 14 October, the Minister for Multicultural Affairs confirmed that Home Affairs had issued One Path Network a notice of intention to terminate[23] its $308,000 multicultural media grant.[24] For many Muslims, One Path is valued for its representation, education and community engagement, making the potential loss of funding especially consequential.
The move followed criticism from Jewish organisations and Opposition politicians.[25][26] One Path rejected antisemitism and warned against conflating criticism of Israeli policy with hatred of Jews.[27] They have also maintained that its material reflected information already published in mainstream media. Allegations of antisemitism and any form of hate or racism warrant serious examination, but journalistic credibility must be assessed on evidence, accuracy and context, rather than controversy or political pressure. Home Affairs issued a notice of intention to terminate, not a finding of breach or final decision - a significant distinction.[28]
The program requires certain applicants to show their content does not undermine “social cohesion”.[29] When such an ambiguous standard is applied amid political pressure, a principle intended to foster inclusion risks becoming a mechanism for suppressing legitimate criticism. Who decides when a Muslim media platform’s reporting becomes grounds for withdrawing public funding, and will such allegations be assessed transparently and fairly, particularly when its reporting challenges powerful interests? A program supporting independent multicultural media must not compromise that independence by treating dissent as a threat.
These are distinct decisions that together expose a common risk. In one, social cohesion is invoked to justify restricting public scrutiny of police conduct and denying impacted civilians the opportunity to be publicly heard. In the other, it forms part of a funding framework under which a Muslim media platform faces potential withdrawal of public support amid political pressure. A principle meant to foster inclusion risks restricting voices seeking accountability.
Silencing grievances does not resolve them. It deepens mistrust and alienation, particularly when those affected are denied meaningful opportunities to be heard. Social cohesion requires democratic freedoms, fair and transparent decisions, and accountable institutions. A cohesive Australia allows people to pray, protest and challenge authority without fear of marginalisation. If accountability itself is treated as a threat to social cohesion, what exactly are we seeking to hold together?
Written by Adam Al-hayek and Alisha Fayaz
[1] Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, 'Social Cohesion Compass' (Web Page) <https://scanloninstitute.org.au/research/tools/social-cohesion-compass/>.
[2] Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, 'Social Cohesion Compass' (n 1).
[3] Nicholas Biddle and Matthew Gray, Social Cohesion and Support for Democracy in Australia: Assessing Recent Polling Data and Frameworks (Report, Australian National University, March 2026) 2–3 <https://polis.cass.anu.edu.au/files/docs/2026/3/Social-Cohesion-and-Support-for-Democracy-in-Australia---For-web.pdf>.
[4] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, Operation Makalu: Decision on Use of Public and Private Hearings (Decision, 29 September 2026) [109]–[120] <https://www.lecc.nsw.gov.au/publications/publications/operation-makalu-decision-on-use-of-public-and-private-hearings/@@download/file> ('LECC Decision').
[5] Ted Regencia and News Agencies, 'More Australia Protests over Police Crackdown on Rally against Herzog Visit', Al Jazeera (online, 10 February 2026) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/10/more-australia-protests-over-police-crackdown-on-rally-against-herzog-visit>.
[6] Aftab Malik, 'Shocking NSW Police Violence against Muslims Praying', Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia (Statement, 9 February 2026) <https://www.oseci.gov.au/news/article/shocking-nsw-police-violence-against-muslims-praying>.
[7] Human Rights Watch, 'Australia: Excessive Force Used against Herzog Protesters' (News Release, 10 February 2026) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/10/australia-excessive-force-used-against-herzog-protesters>.
[8] Legal Observers NSW, Police Operation at the Sydney Town Hall Protest on 9 February 2026 (Report, July 2026) 3–4 <https://legalobserversnsw.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/lonsw_report_-_police_operation_at_the_sydney_town_hall_protest_9_february_2026.pdf>.
[9] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, LECC Decision (n 4) [109]–[120].
[10] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, LECC Decision (n 4) [109]–[120].
[11] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (NSW) s 63(1)–(5).
[12] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (NSW) s 3(b).
[13] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, LECC Decision (n 4) [111]–[114].
[14] Anne Peterscheck, Sarah Marsden and Nadine Salman, Individual-Level Perspectives on Mobilisation, Protest and Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment (Report, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, July 2025) 31–2, 36 <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/individual-level-perspectives-on-mobilisation-protest-and-radicalisation-a-rapid-evidence-assessment/>.
[15] Jarrett v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWCA 62, [136], [143], [146] ('Jarrett').
[16] Jarrett (n 15) [157], [170].
[17] Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43, [88]–[91], [152], [182] ('Brown').
[18] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 21.
[19] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 37 (2020) on the Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (17 September 2020) [1], [8]–[9], [23]–[24].
[20] Commonwealth of Australia, Letters Patent Establishing the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion (9 January 2026) (recitals) <https://asc.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/letters-patent-royal-commission-antisemitism-and-social-cohesion>.
[21] François Kunc, 'How Can We Live Together: Pulling Together or Coming Apart?' (Speech, Law Night Dinner of the Sydney Catenians and the St Thomas More Society, 6 May 2026) 8–10 <https://supremecourt.nsw.gov.au/documents/Publications/Speeches/2026-speeches/KuncJ-20260506.pdf>.
[22] James O'Donnell, Qing Guan and Trish Prentice, Mapping Social Cohesion 2024 (Report, Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, 2024) 77 <https://scanloninstitute.org.au/mapping-social-cohesion-2024/>.
[23] 'Government Moves to Terminate OnePath Grant', The Australian Jewish News (online, 14 October 2026) <https://www.australianjewishnews.com/government-moves-to-terminate-onepath-grant/>.
[24] Victoria Pengilley and Phoebe Pin, 'Social Cohesion Grant Given to Media Network That Platformed US Conspiracy Theorist, Antisemitism Inquiry Told', ABC News (online, 24 August 2026) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-24/podcast-platformed-conspiracy-theorist-antisemitism-inquiry-told/107072806>.
[25] Colin Rubenstein, 'AIJAC Applauds Australia for Voting against Durban Resolution at UN; Terminating OnePath Funding', Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (Media Release, 14 October 2026) <https://aijac.org.au/media-release/aijac-applauds-australia-for-voting-against-durban-resolution-at-un-terminating-one-path-funding/>.
[26] 'Government Moves to Terminate OnePath Grant' (n 24).
[27] Pengilley and Pin, 'Social Cohesion Grant Given to Media Network' (n 25).
[28] 'Government Moves to Terminate OnePath Grant' (n 24).
[29] Department of Home Affairs, 'Independent Multicultural Media – Transformation and Sustainability' (Web Page) <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/multicultural-grants/grant-delivery/independent-multicultural-media-transformation-and-sustainability> (Category 3 eligibility criteria).
[30] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (NSW) s 22.
[31] Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580–1 [99]–[100].